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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are Catholic organizations that represent the interests of
Catholic laity and workers. Amici write in support of Plaintiff-Appellant to
provide the Second Circuit with context about the devastating consequences
for lay Catholic workers if the district court’s decision is upheld. They
respectfully urge this Court to reverse the district court’s ruling that a lay
Catholic school principal is a minister for purposes of the First
Amendment’s ministerial exception. The Amicus Curiae brief includes the
following organizations:
Call To Action is one of the largest organizations working for
equality and justice in the Catholic Church today. With over 25,000
members and supporters and 50 chapters nationally, Call To Action
educates, inspires, and activates Catholics to act for justice and build
inclusive communities. In doing so, Call To Action does not condone
discrimination on the basis of sexual identity, conscience decisions, and/or
personal decision-making that does not conform to institutional Catholic
dictates.
DignityUSA is an organization of Catholics committed to justice,
equality, and full inclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people
in our Church and society. We support clear and fair employment policies
for all people, including those who work for Catholic institutions, that
protect those employees from discrimination on the basis of age, gender,
sexual orientation, marital status, disability, religion, decisions of
conscience, or any other factor, and that provide for clear and fair appeal
processes in the event of discipline or dismissal.
FutureChurch is a twenty-six year old organization with outreach to
nearly 25,000 members, donors, activists, and participants, promoting the
rights and responsibilities of all the baptized in the Roman Catholic Church.
We work for just treatment for all church workers, educators, theologians,
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), the undersigned states that no party’s
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s counsel
contributed to funding the preparation or the submission of this brief.
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), all parties to this appeal have consented to
the filing of this amici curiae brief.
1

1
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ministers, and lay employees. Just treatment for Church workers is core to
FutureChurch’s “Justice in the Church” Initiative, which seeks to provide
immediate resources and advice for ministers and employees who have been
silenced, fired, or otherwise treated unjustly. As an organization we:
provide resources documenting the rights and responsibilities of Catholics as
identified in Church documents and referrals to those who can help;
document and uncover unjust treatment of Church ministers and employees;
and honor dioceses/parishes with good practices and structures for Church
ministers and employees.
FutureChurch believes that as Catholics who love the Church and
want to see it flourish for years to come, we must preserve the integrity of
our faith tradition as we face the many challenges of our times. Church law
clearly tells us it is our right and sometimes our duty to speak out about
matters that concern the good of the Church. (Canon 212.3). The Vatican II
document, Gaudium et Spes, reminds us that with respect to the fundamental
rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural,
whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion, is
to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's intent (29).
FutureChurch affirms the dignity and rights of all human beings, rejects
discrimination of every sort, including discrimination based on sex, gender,
race, and sexual orientation.
The National Coalition of American Nuns (NCAN) is a national
Catholic organization of women religious dedicated to working, studying,
and speaking out on justice issues in church and society since 1969. Its 300
members are individual women religious in Roman Catholic congregations
of nuns in the United States. NCAN prioritizes such issues as poverty,
workers’ rights, environmental responsibility, women’s equality, and respect
and justice for all marginalized peoples.
New Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of justice and
reconciliation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people and the wider
Catholic Church. In our 39-year history, we have worked with hundreds of
parishes, schools, colleges, hospitals, religious communities of vowed men
and women, promoting greater equality for LGBT people. Recently, we
have been involved with numerous cases where LGBT people and their
allies have been fired from Catholic institutions due to their support for
marriage equality and other issues. Because we value the Catholic teaching
on the inherent human dignity of all people, as well as the teaching that
2
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promotes justice for workers, we strongly support the right of church
employees to due process when disputes occur. Catholic church employees
do not forgo their U.S. civil rights when employed by church institutions.
Voice of the Faithful is a movement of faithful Catholics that started
in the basement of a church in response to the sexual abuse crisis in the
Church and has grown to a worldwide movement of 30,000 members
dedicated to their mission of providing a prayerful voice, attentive to the
Spirit, through which the faithful can actively participate in the governance
and guidance of the Catholic Church.
Drawing on our baptismal responsibility for the life and work of the
Church, VOTF members commit themselves to supporting survivors;
supporting priests who are helping to heal survivors and correct institutional
flaws in the Church; and working to reform governing structures so that
abuse of authority could never happen again.
Nourished by its members’ deep love for the Body of Christ, VOTF
seeks full transparency and accountability in Church governance and full
incorporation of lay Catholics in the life and work of the Church at every
level.
Attendant to full lay participation in the Church, VOTF promotes
equality of all faithful in the life and work of the Church and abhors
discrimination of any kind that thwarts the faithful in their pursuit of that
work. As the faithful have secured rights and responsibilities resulting from
their baptism, so VOTF holds church institutions accountable for addressing
those rights and responsibilities in light of the church’s most prized values.

3

Case 16-1271, Document 26, 08/08/2016, 1835283, Page10 of 31

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant Joanne Fratello is a lay Catholic by faith and a lay principal
by contract. The district court recognized those two facts, finding “[t]here is
no dispute that Plaintiff is not a member of the clergy and that she would not
be considered a minister for purposes of Church governance.” Fratello v.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, No. 12-CV-7359 (CS), 2016 WL
1249609, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016). Yet the court nonetheless
transformed Fratello into a minister, ruling that “the issue here is one of
U.S., not canon, law, and ‘minister’ for purposes of the ministerial exception
has a far broader meaning than it does for internal Church purposes.” Id.
Relying on this misinterpretation of the ministerial exception, the court
mistakenly dismissed Appellant’s Title VII gender discrimination and
retaliation claims and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
related New York State breach of contract claim. Id. at *13.
With those words the district court risked turning every employee of
faith into a minister unprotected by the nation’s race, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, age, disability, pregnancy, equal pay, and sexual
harassment antidiscrimination laws. In doing so, the court misread the
Supreme

Court’s

ministerial

exception

precedent,

Hosanna-Tabor

Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012),

4
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in two ways. First, it misapplied the Court’s four-part test of ministerial
status to label Fratello a minister even though she had never taken any active
steps toward ministry. Second, it ignored the Supreme Court’s statements
about breach of contract lawsuits and the relevance of Fratello’s “lay
principal” contract status to the ministerial-exception discussion.
By holding that U.S. law creates a minister out of a lay principal, the
court also ran afoul of both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The
district court offended the Establishment Clause by giving an absolute
preference to employers’ religious beliefs over their employees’ beliefs and
contractual expectations. The district court also violated Fratello’s Free
Exercise rights by ordaining her even though she had never chosen
ministerial status, received ministerial training, or held herself out as a
minister.
The district court’s broad ruling threatens the employment status of
12,268 Catholic school principals and teachers in New York State alone,
who could lose the protection of the state and federal race, national origin,
gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, pregnancy, equal pay, and sexual
harassment

antidiscrimination

laws.

See

THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC

DIRECTORY 1, 171-98, 866, 943, 1134-53, 1410, 1538-72 (P.J. Kenedy and

5
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Sons, 2015). Joanne Fratello is entitled to her day in court. Therefore, the
Amici respectfully ask this Court to reverse the ruling of the district court.
ARGUMENT
I. The district court misinterpreted Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), in two
ways.
Joanne Fratello’s facts and circumstances in this case were nothing
like the situation of Cheryl Perich, the Lutheran schoolteacher whom the
Supreme Court found to be a minister in Hosanna-Tabor. The district court
misapplied the four Hosanna factors to Fratello, a non-ministerial school
employee, and underestimated the importance of Appellant’s contract title:
lay principal.
A. The district court misapplied the four-factor test of HosannaTabor, which emphasizes “the formal title given … by the Church,
the substance reflected in that title, [the employee’s] own use of
that title, and the important religious functions she performed for
the Church” to an employee who had never taken any steps
toward ministry.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Supreme Court for the first time
recognized a ministerial exception, grounded in the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, that requires the dismissal of some employment
discrimination lawsuits by ministers against their religious employers. The
case involved a “commissioned” teacher at a Lutheran elementary school,
6
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Cheryl Perich, who was fired when she tried to return to work after a
medical leave of absence for narcolepsy. Id. at 700. Perich alleged retaliation
under the Americans With Disabilities Act. Id.
The Opinion of the Court did not adopt a bright-line test identifying
who qualifies as a minister for ministerial exception purposes, and
announced its reluctance “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an
employee qualifies as a minister.” Id. at 707. The Court’s ruling in HosannaTabor was heavily fact-dependent. Instead of a bright-line test, the Court
summarized the four issues relevant to Perich’s ministerial status: “the
formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title,
her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed
for the Church.” Id. at 708.
About those four issues, the Court was detailed in its inclusion of the
facts of Perich’s case. Perich held the official title, “Minister of Religion,
Commissioned,” spelled out on her “diploma of vocation,” and was
reviewed by her congregation for her “skills of ministry,” “ministerial
responsibilities,” and “continuing education as a professional person in the
ministry of the Gospel.” Id. at 707. Perich also had significant religious
training (eight college-level courses and oral examinations) as well as an
official commissioning (requiring endorsement by the local synod, letters of

7
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recommendation, a personal statement, written answers to ministry-related
questions, and election by a congregation). Id.
The Court noted that “Perich held herself out as a minister of the
Church,” not only by accepting the church’s call to service and describing
herself as a minister at Hosanna-Tabor, but also by claiming a housing
allowance on her tax return that was available only to members of the
ministry. Id. at 707-708. Moreover, “Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a
minister” by issuing her a “diploma of vocation” and titling her “Minister of
Religion, Commissioned.” Id. Finally, “Perich's job duties reflected a role in
conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission. … As a source
of religious instruction, Perich performed an important role in transmitting
the Lutheran faith to the next generation.” Id. at 708.
In stark contrast to Perich, Appellant Joanne Fratello is a lay Catholic,
who was originally hired as a lay teacher. She had the formal title “lay
principal,” was held out by the school as a principal, possessed secular
educational training in school administration, and never “held herself out as
a minister” of the church or claimed tax benefits available only to ministers
and clergy. She has no training or education in ministry, theology, or
religious studies, and applied for a principal’s job requiring a Master’s or
equivalent degree in education. Fratello Rule 56.1 Stmt, see also Herx v.

8
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Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Ind.
2014) appeal dismissed, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Diocese hasn't
shown that Mrs. Herx’s teaching qualifications or job responsibilities in any
way compare to Ms. Perich’s situation. Nothing in the summary judgment
record suggests that Mrs. Herx was a member of the clergy of the Catholic
Church. Mrs. Herx has never led planning for a Mass, hasn’t been ordained
by the Catholic Church, hasn’t held a title with the Catholic Church, has
never had (and wasn’t required to have) any religious instruction or training
to be a teacher at the school, has never held herself out as a priest or
minister, and was considered by the principal to be a ‘lay teacher.’”);
Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 136 F. Supp. 3d
1094, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Catholic high school teacher was not a
minister even though she spent one out of her five class periods on Campus
Ministry duties because her degree was a Bachelor of Science in biology and
not related in any way to theology or religion).
The district court described at length Fratello’s work duties and
erroneously concluded that her leadership role in the school made Fratello a
minister. In fact, her leadership role made her a successful lay principal –
just as the words of Appellees’ job advertisement and Appellant’s contract
stated.
9
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B. The district court underestimated the importance of the
contract language identifying Appellant as a “lay principal.”
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court explicitly stated it “express[ed] no view
on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers.” Id. at 710.
The Supreme Court’s breach of contract language in Hosanna-Tabor
is significant. Pre- and post-Hosanna-Tabor, state and federal courts have
repeatedly held that a “church is always free to burden its activities
voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in
civil court.” Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf., 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871)). “Even cases
that rejected ministers’ discrimination claims have noted that churches
nonetheless ‘may be held liable upon their valid contracts.’” Id. (quoting
Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171
(4th Cir. 1985)); see also Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and supported by
consideration, in no way constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church's
free exercise rights. Accordingly, application of state law to . . . contract
claim[s] would not violate the Free Exercise Clause”); Crymes v. Grace
Hope Presbyterian Church, Inc., No. 2011–CA–000746–MR, 2012 WL
10
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3236290 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012); Second Episcopal District African
Methodist Episcopal Church v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812 (D.C. 2012) (postHosanna cases allowing ministerial breach of contract claims to proceed).
Hosanna-Tabor did not change that fundamental principle. If
ministers can sue churches for breach of contract then a fortiori can a lay
principal sue a private school that includes teachers, staff, and students of
diverse religious identities. The principle of holding employers to their
contracts applies in this case. That principle carries over to Appellant’s Title
VII case because the contract determines Fratello’s lay principal, nonministerial status for Title VII purposes. St. Anthony’s School sought, hired,
and contracted with a lay principal with education and experience in school
administration and held her out as such. Neither the school nor the court can
transform her into a minister in defiance of the parties’ contractual
agreement. “Deeming Mrs. [Fratello] a ‘minister’ of the Catholic Church
would expand the scope of the ministerial exception too far and, in fact,
would moot the religious exemptions of Title VII.” Herx, 48 F. Supp. 3d at
1177.
The district court mistakenly held that the school’s requirement that
the principal be a practicing Catholic transformed Appellant into a minister.
That ruling was incorrect on the facts of this case and is dangerous as a
11
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precedent for future academic employment disputes. Ms. Fratello’s ecclesial
status as a lay practicing Catholic is nothing like that of ordained Catholic
priest Father Justinian Rweyemamu, whom this Court decided “easily falls”
within the ministerial exception. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d
Cir. 2008). This Court has repeatedly recognized the distinction between
ordained Catholic clergy and lay Catholic employees who sue for
discrimination, recognizing that as a general rule “we will permit lay
employees—but perhaps not religious employees—to bring discrimination
suits against their religious employers.” Id. at 207; see also DeMarco v. Holy
Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing a lay Catholic high
school math teacher to pursue an Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) case); Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of New York v.
Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1162 (2d Cir. 1985) (First Amendment does not
“prohibit the New York State Labor Relations Board from exercising
jurisdiction over the labor relations between parochial schools and their lay
teachers”).
Nonetheless, the district court completely erased the distinction
between lay and ordained Catholics with its sweeping statement that
although Appellant was unquestionably not a minister within her own
church, “the issue here is one of U.S., not canon, law, and ‘minister’ for

12
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purposes of the ministerial exception has a far broader meaning than it does
for internal Church purposes.” Fratello at *12. Such court-imposed ministry
in defiance of ecclesial and contract status would have devastating
consequences for the 12,268 Catholic schoolteachers and principals in New
York State and the 14,831 Catholic educators who work within the Second
Circuit. See KENEDY at 1-66, 171-98, 214, 553, 866, 943, 1134-53, 1410,
1538-72. Thus countless thousands of Americans could lose the protection
of the nation’s race, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age,
disability, pregnancy, equal pay, and sexual harassment antidiscrimination
laws.
Recently Catholic high school teachers in San Francisco – with the
vocal support of significant numbers of Catholic lay parents and lay Catholic
politicians from the State Assembly and the Board of Supervisors –
vigorously rejected their archbishop’s request to sign new employment
contracts labeling all teachers as ministers. Those California teachers
understood that such contract language inaccurately characterized both their
ecclesial status and their jobs. They knew they were lay teachers seeking
academic excellence for students, not ordained priests offering pastoral
ministry to parishioners. Those teachers also recognized that such contract
wording “could exempt them from federal anti-discrimination law in the

13
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event of dismissal.” Lee Romney, Faculty, Staff at S.F. Archdiocese Schools
Sign Petition Rejecting Archbishop’s Additions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2015, at
B3. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors warned that contracts
arbitrarily redefining teachers as ministers were “contrary to shared San
Francisco values of non-discrimination, women’s rights, inclusion, and
equality for all humans.” Id. at B6.
An Indiana district court similarly cautioned that labeling Catholic lay
teacher Emily Herx a minister “based on her attendance and participation in
prayer and religious services with her students, which was done in a
supervisory capacity, would greatly expand the scope of the ministerial
exception and ultimately would qualify all of the Diocese's teachers as
ministers, a position rejected by the Hosanna–Tabor Court.” Herx, 48 F.
Supp. 3d at 1177 (emphasis added); see also Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad.,
No. NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042, at *11 (Mass. Super. Dec. 16,
2015) (“[t]o apply the ‘ministerial’ exception here would allow all religious
schools to exempt all of their employees from employment discrimination
laws simply by calling their employees ministers. If that were the rule, most
of the discussion in Hosanna–Tabor would have been unnecessary.”).
Like the San Francisco and Indiana teachers, Fratello never thought of
herself as a minister or held herself out as a minister. She signed her contract

14
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to be a lay principal. Yet the district court saw the words “lay principal” in
her employment contract and read them to mean “minister.” By the district
court’s reasoning, every single one of the 60 million lay practicing Catholics
in the United States is potentially a minister who is unprotected by the
nation’s most fundamental federal and state antidiscrimination laws. Indeed,
even non-Catholics may be at risk; at least one Catholic Archdiocese has
argued that a non-Catholic teacher qualified for the ministerial exception.
See Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL
360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (rejecting ministerial exception defense in
case of non-Catholic computer technology coordinator fired for pregnancy).
In practice, the district court deferred completely to Defendants’
ministerial characterization of Ms. Fratello. Yet only one Justice in
Hosanna-Tabor – Justice Thomas – ruled that courts must adopt the
religious employer’s characterization of the employee. Hosanna–Tabor, 132
S. Ct. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring). In contrast, this Court has properly
interpreted the controlling opinion of the Court in Hosanna-Tabor to require
a court “to make its own determination whether the plaintiff was a minister
subject to the ministerial exception.” Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of
Educ. of City of New York, 750 F.3d 184, 204 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1730 (2015) (emphasis added). If a school said a janitor was a
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minister, for example, “the court would have to determine whether under the
actual law of the church in question (and not as a subterfuge) janitors really
were ministers.” Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036,
1039 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Hosanna-Tabor, 132
S. Ct. at 709, n. 4; see also Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic
Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010) (“we agree with
the courts that have held that, if a church labels a person a religious official
as a mere ‘subterfuge’ to avoid statutory obligations, the ministerial
exception does not apply.”). It is an open secret that many religious
organizations are seeking new means to redescribe their employees as
ministers so that they can fire LGBT and other suspect employees without
legal repercussion. See, e.g., ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, PROTECTING
YOUR MINISTRY

FROM

A LEGAL GUIDE

FOR

SCHOOLS,

AND

SEXUAL ORIENTATION GENDER IDENTITY LAWSUITS:
SOUTHERN BAPTIST

AND

EVANGELICAL CHURCHES,

MINISTRIES 12 (2015) (“When feasible, a religious

organization should assign its employees duties that involve ministerial,
teaching, or other spiritual qualifications – duties that directly further the
religious mission. For example, if a church receptionist answers the phone,
the job description might detail how the receptionist is required to answer
basic questions about the church’s faith, provide religious resources, or pray
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with callers. Consider requiring all employees to participate in devotional or
prayer time, or to even lead these on occasion.”); Ian Millhiser, Christian
Denomination Plans to Avoid Civil Rights Laws By Pretending Receptionists
Are

“Ministers,”

THINKPROGRESS.ORG,

Jun.

13,

2015,

at

http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/06/13/3668626/inside-southern-baptistconventions-devious-plan-defeat-anti-discrimination-laws/ (The “Protecting
Your Ministry manual instructs religious employers to layer religious duties
on top of each of their employees’ actual job descriptions in an effort to
convince courts that every single one of these employees qualifies as a
minister.”).
This Court must not support the subterfuge that dismissed this case.
Under the actual law of the church in question in this case, Joanne Fratello is
not a minister. The ministerial exception of the First Amendment does not
authorize the district court to ordain her to ministry. Indeed such ordination
violates both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
II.

The district court’s reasoning violated both Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment by creating an absolute preference for
religious employers over employees without any regard for
employees’ rights.
The rule of the Free Exercise Clause is that everyone must comply

with “valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability.” Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). Neither
17
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this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that any religious conduct,
including the ministerial exception, is absolutely protected in all
circumstances by the First Amendment. Although the freedom to believe “is
absolute,” the freedom to act “cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell v. State of Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); see also Rector, Wardens, & Members of
Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354
(2d Cir. 1990) (government “may restrict certain activities associated with
the practice of religion pursuant to its general regulatory powers.”).
Nonetheless, the district court interpreted the ministerial exception to
swallow Smith’s free exercise rule. The court created an unconstitutionally
absolute right to harmful conduct when it concluded that Fratello’s actual
religious identity and beliefs were irrelevant to its ministerial exception
analysis. That absolute preference for employers’ over employees’ religious
freedom violates both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment and contradicts Hosanna-Tabor’s reasoning. See, e.g.,
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 706 (1985) (Connecticut law
giving employees an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their
Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786–87 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Among
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the reasons the United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free is that no
person may be restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or
her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other
persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the
law deems compelling.”). The Religion Clauses require equal consideration
of Appellant’s and Appellees’ religious freedom interests. Yet the district
court’s analysis ignored this balance of freedoms by completely tipping the
scale toward Appellees.
When the Hosanna-Tabor Court recognized that the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment compel a ministerial exception, only Justice Thomas
suggested that courts should defer to the employer’s characterization of the
employee as a minister. Hosanna–Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 711 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Eight Justices rejected the idea that religious employers deserve
absolute immunity from employment discrimination claims. See id. at 694;
see also Bronx Household, 750 F.3d at 204 (Hosanna-Tabor requires a court
“to make its own determination whether the plaintiff was a minister subject
to the ministerial exception.”).
Hosanna-Tabor is consistent with the Court’s Establishment Clause
precedents, which prohibit states from conferring absolute benefits on some
religious actors at the expense of third parties’ rights. In Estate of Thornton
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v. Caldor, Inc., for example, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that
gave Sabbatarians an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath because the
statute took “no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.” 472 U.S. at 709. In
Caldor, the Court approvingly identified “a fundamental principle of the
Religion Clauses, so well-articulated by Judge Learned Hand” in this Court
in 1953:
“The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities.”
Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d
Cir. 1953)). Similarly, in United States v. Lee, the Court rejected Amish
employers’ requests for exemption from paying social security taxes because
the exemption “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the
employees.” 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
Since Caldor, the Court has repeatedly held that an “unyielding
weighting in favor of [religious organizations] over all other interests”
violates the Establishment Clause. 472 U.S. at 710; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 722 (2005). The Court has consistently considered the effects of
religious accommodations on the well-being of third parties whose interests
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might be affected by the accommodation. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing
Caldor) (in RLUIPA context, courts “must take adequate account of the
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”).
The Court always weighs the proposed actions of First Amendment
rights holders against potential harm to third parties because “[a]t some
point, accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful
fostering of religion’” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). This unlawful point was reached
when the district court gave Appellees an absolute and unqualified immunity
by dismissing Appellant’s lawsuit even though “[t]here is no dispute that
Plaintiff is not a member of the clergy and that she would not be considered
a minister for purposes of Church governance.” Fratello at *12. In defiance
of the First Amendment, the district court gave Appellees an “absolute and
unqualified” exemption where “religious concerns automatically control
over all secular interests in the workplace,” “no matter what burden or
inconvenience this imposes on the . . . workers.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at 70809.
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The burden on Joanne Fratello in this case, however, was no mere
inconvenience. Instead, this lay principal’s free exercise rights were
completely eradicated. “The free exercise of religion means, first and
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
desires.” Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877; Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S.
& Canada v. New York City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d
183, 193 (2d Cir. 2014). In Religion Clause jurisprudence, there is
“widespread agreement that religious faith and practice should be voluntary.
… Each person decides for himself or herself what to believe.” Christopher
C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of HosannaTabor, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1197 (2014) (emphasis added); see also
Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1511 (D. Colo. 1989), aff'd, 921
F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (“the goal of the Free Exercise Clause is to keep
religious faith voluntary”).
Joanne Fratello is voluntarily a lay Catholic by faith and a lay
principal by contract. “There is no dispute that Plaintiff is not a member of
the clergy and that she would not be considered a minister for purposes of
Church governance.” Fratello at *12. The Religion Clauses forbid the court
to impose ministerial status on her without her consent. See Lee, 455 U.S. at
261.
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The ministerial exception protects churches and their ministers who
voluntarily agree to perform religious functions and promote religious goals
together. Churches are not exempt, however, from adhering to their
“completely voluntary” contractual obligations. Petruska, 462 F.3 at 310.
Appellant has never taken any voluntary steps toward ministry. She has
secular training and signed a contract as a lay principal. Thus, the courtimposed ministry that dismissed her case is beyond the pale of the First
Amendment, which requires the Appellees to obey the valid, neutral, and
general antidiscrimination laws prohibiting gender discrimination. “To
permit [Appellees to have absolute immunity from antidiscrimination laws]
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every [private school, hospital,
university, or social service agency] to become a law unto [them]sel[ves].”
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. The First Amendment expressly prohibits that
outcome.
CONCLUSION
The consequences of affirming the district court’s decision in this case
would be catastrophic for the 14,831 Catholic educators in New York State
and the Second Circuit, who, like Ms. Fratello, could lose the protection of
the nation’s antidiscrimination laws by being ordained to a ministerial status
23
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they never held. If the district court’s reasoning is upheld, every practicing
lay Catholic employee in the country could be transformed into a minister
devoid of employment rights and outside the protection of the nation’s race,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, pregnancy, equal
pay, and sexual harassment antidiscrimination laws. Therefore, Amici
respectfully request this Court to reverse the ruling of the district court and
allow Appellant her day in court.
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